Index – Abroad – Five possible scenarios for the future of Russia

Vladimir Putin turned 71 last October 7, the day Hamas attacked Israel. The Russian president celebrated the rampage as a birthday present that diverted attention from the aggression in Ukraine. Perhaps as a sign of his gratitude, he invited high-ranking representatives of Hamas to Moscow at the end of October, thereby emphasizing the convergence of their interests. A few weeks later, the Russian president announced his intention to run in the March 2024 election, and later held his annual press conference.

Our armed forces are improving their situation along almost the entire front line – let’s put it modestly

Putin boasted live.

Putin is setting himself up as the new tsar. But a true czar wouldn’t have to worry about the succession crisis — and what it might mean for the current hold on power. For Putin, yes; this is partly why you have to hold mock elections. He is currently in office until 2030, when he will be 78 years old. The life expectancy of men in Russia does not even reach 67 years, those who live to the age of 60 can expect a life expectancy of about 80 years. However, even Stalin died once.

“And Putin is not Stalin. The Georgian despot built a superpower while sending tens of millions to their deaths. Putin, on the other hand, built a rogue power. The comparison is nevertheless instructive. Stalin’s system did not survive the dictator. In the midst of the decline that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but continued long after 1991, Putin consolidated a new autocracy” – writes a Foreign Affairs on its columns Stephen Kotkina senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

This fusion of fragility and path dependence (that is, the phenomenon that essentially random events in positive feedback systems do not produce random development, but move in an increasingly determined pattern) stems from a number of factors that are not easy to recreate: geography, national-imperial identity, deep-rooted strategic culture. (The 19th century Russian satirist Mikhail Saltykov-Schedrin remarked about his country that it changes drastically every decade, but nothing changes in 200 years.)

One: Russia as France

France has a deep-rooted bureaucratic and monarchical tradition – as well as a rich revolutionary tradition. The revolutionaries abolished the monarchy, only for it to return in the form of king and emperor, then disappear again as republics came and went. France built and lost a huge colonial empire. The rulers of France, of which Napoleon was the greatest, threatened the country’s neighbors for centuries.

Russia also has a state and monarchical tradition that will survive regardless of the nature of any future political system, and a rich revolutionary tradition that can live on in institutions and memory as an inspiring and cautionary example.

It may be tempting to think that Russia needs its own de Gaulle to consolidate a top-down liberal order—even if no such deus ex machina appears on Russia’s immediate horizon. However, only hagiographers believe that one man created modern France. Despite its unstable moments, France has spent generations developing the impartial, professional institutions of a democratic, republican nation—the judiciary, the civil service, and a free and open public sphere—that are essential to a democratic nation. The problem with Russia was not primarily that Yeltsin was not de Gaulle.

Two: Russia is turning back

Some in Russia would perhaps be happy if it transformed into a country similar to France, but others would find this outcome abhorrent. What the world now calls Putinism first emerged in the Russian-language periodicals of the 1970s: as an authoritarian, mystical nationalism based on anti-Westernism, professing nominally traditional values, and borrowing incoherently from Slavophilism, Eurasianism, and from Eastern Orthodoxy. One can imagine an authoritarian nationalist leader who embraces these views and, like Putin, adamantly believes that the United States is out to destroy Russia, yet is deeply troubled by Russia’s long-term, murky future—and willing to blame Putin for it.

This could lead to the forced departure of Putin or his natural death. I could force him without it if he stayed in place, but his power would be a significant threat. Whatever happens, it would be mostly a tactical change, spurred by the realization that Russia does not have the means to confront the West indefinitely—it is paying too high a price to try and risking the permanent loss of a vital European relations, and in return becomes humiliatingly dependent on China.

Three: Russia as a vassal

The defiantly pro-Putin Russian elite boasts that it has developed a system that is better than the West. The strait is Chinese–Russian cooperation has surprised many analysts who are aware of Beijing’s delicate past relations with Moscow, including China’s notorious–Soviet break-up in the 1960s, which culminated in a brief border war. Although that conflict was officially ended with a border settlement, Russia remains the only country to control territories confiscated by what the Chinese consider unfair treaties. This has not stopped China and Russia from strengthening their ties, including through large-scale joint military exercises.

The growing imbalance in the relationship has led analysts to refer to Russia as China’s vassal. However, only China can decide whether a country becomes its vassal. In this case, Beijing would dictate what kind of policy Russia pursues, and it would also decide on personnel matters. China has no binding treaty obligations to Russia. Putin can only rely on the word given by the 70-year-old Xi Jinping – and Xi is also mortal. Despite this, the two leaders continue to condemn US pursuit of hegemony and work closely together. A shared commitment to making the world order secure in order to preserve their own dictatorships and dominate their regions places them in a de facto vassalage relationship that neither sees as beneficial.

Four: Russia as North Korea

As Russia’s dependence on China grows, Putin or his successor may paradoxically be inspired by the North Korean experience—which, in turn, may make Xi or his successor think twice. Given that North Korea is extremely dependent on China for food, fuel and more, Beijing seems to be “holding” its leader, Kim Jong-un.

Since the Prigozhin rebellion, Xi has emphasized that their special relationship will outlive the current Kremlin leadership. An authoritarian China could hardly afford to lose Russia if it meant facing a pro-American Russia on its northern border. In this case, access to Russian oil and gas, which is China’s hedge against a maritime blockade, would be at risk. A Russia moving closer to America would allow for increased Western surveillance of China. Worse, China would suddenly have to redeploy significant assets to secure its northern border.

Five: Russia plunged into chaos

Putin’s regime fends off internal challenges by threatening chaos. However, while spreading chaos abroad, Russia itself may fall victim to it. The Putin regime appears more or less stable, and predictions of a collapse due to Western sanctions have not come true. There could be many reasons for a crash in the near future:

In the midst of chaos, even without major territorial losses, criminal organizations and cybercriminals can operate with impunity. Control over nuclear and biological weapons and the scientists who developed them would be lost—a nightmare that could have followed the Soviet collapse but was largely avoided. If this were to happen again, it is impossible to predict how the Russians would handle the situation. Chaos does not necessarily mean a doomsday scenario. But it can mean.

(Cover photo: Vladimir Putin on April 2, 2024. Photo: Contributor / Getty Images)