“We cannot sit idly by when we see France, India and Greece using Armenia as a weapon against us,” Azeri President Ilham Aliyev said on Tuesday. “We have to take serious measures if we see a serious threat to ourselves,” the head of state added.
Yerevan’s French connection
The Russian-Ukrainian and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts have a serious impact on the Eurasian regional security framework. These conflicts shape and strengthen the contours of various relationships, including the Armenia-France relationship.
Photo: Photo: MTI/EPA/Armenia Ministry of Defense
Defense (including arms sales to Armenia) has long been a primary sector of cooperation between Yerevan and Paris. The Nagorno-Karabakh war deepened their ties as France began selling air defense systems to bolster Armenia’s response. On October 23, 2023, the two countries signed a contract for three Ground Masters radars, including telescopes and sensors. As part of the signed contract, regular meetings are held between defense ministers and an agreement was reached to send a French defense consultant to train Armenian soldiers.
France is home to the largest Armenian diaspora in the European Union and the third largest in the world, with around 500,000 people.
French governments therefore recognize the electoral importance of this diaspora. Armenian causes find support across ideological divides in France.
Reactions of Russia and Azerbaijan
The opposing positions of France and Russia regarding Ukraine – especially after President Emmanuel Macron announced that he would deploy troops on Ukrainian territory – worsened relations between the two countries. Therefore, French involvement in Armenia is viewed with even greater suspicion. In the long run, Armenia, like Ukraine, can become the scene of a new “big game” between the two powers. Moscow has already announced that it is fundamentally rethinking its relationship with Armenia, Yerevan continues to lean towards the West.
Azerbaijan also has a negative view of expanding French-Armenian relations and has criticized recent developments in defense cooperation between the two countries.
The Azeri government accuses France of fomenting a new war in the region by arming Armenia, and warns in advance that France would be guilty if another conflict breaks out.
The Azeris also condemn what they believe is France’s lack of credibility in the peace process, despite being co-chair of the Minsk Group.
Are India and Armenia moving towards a strategic partnership?
When it comes to India’s geopolitical maneuvers, India’s moves are mostly limited to South Asia for now. Until recently, India’s strategic calculations were primarily limited to Pakistan, followed by China. Its relationship with the Western world is largely economic and cultural, apart from a smaller strategic component based on defense agreements.
However, after the India-China relationship deteriorated due to the Chinese incursions into the Himalayas, and actors from outside the region such as Turkey became involved in the Kashmir conflict, India’s foreign policy ideas, approach and strategic calculations increasingly extend beyond South Asia. Manifestations of this include India’s interest in the Indo-Pacific region, global strategic connectivity projects like IMEC, the upsurge in bilateral relations between India and Greece, and New Delhi’s enthusiastic self-promotion during the G20 presidency.
India’s rapprochement with Armenia, a country in the far South Caucasus, is part of this new approach. The visit of Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar to Yerevan in October 2021 is of historic significance as it was the first such visit by an Indian Foreign Minister to Armenia in the preceding thirty years.
In the last three years, India has become one of the main arms suppliers to Armenia.
These high-value defense deals include the sale of Pinaka multiple-barrel missile launchers, a $40 million contract for SWATHI weapons localization radars, anti-tank missiles with ammunition, and 155 mm artillery guns. Armenia is interested in additional defense deals, including drones and anti-drone systems, ammunition and medium-range surface-to-air missiles.
Strategic connectivity and geopolitics
Until the 2020 war, India took a more or less clear position and supported Armenia against Azerbaijan’s territorial aggression. Turkey and Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan made it even more imperative for India to support Armenia.
In 2017, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan signed a tripartite ministerial agreement to boost defense and strategic ties. Notably, Azerbaijan has declared its support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, while Armenia supports India.
Turkish-Pakistani relations date back to 1947. After India revoked Kashmir’s special status in 2019, Turkey became a staunch supporter of Pakistan’s stance towards India. Under Erdogan’s Islamist leadership and pan-Turkish ambitions, Ankara’s interest in and support for Pakistan has strengthened, and outbursts against India have turned vitriolic.
In addition to counterbalancing Turkey and Pakistan, India also sees Armenia as a “hub” to expand its strategic and economic ties to the South Caucasus. Delhi’s most critical interests in this region lie in strategic connectivity projects.
India’s interest in the INSTC (International North-South Corridor), of which Armenia is a part, is firmly rooted in its desire to establish land connectivity with Eurasia, Central Asia and Europe through the Iranian plateau, which is otherwise blocked by Pakistan and Afghanistan.
With this intention, India intends to extend the INSTC to Armenia, connecting the Chabahar port in southeastern Iran with European and Eurasian markets. India and Iran have two options: a railway connecting northwestern Iran with Russia or the Black Sea through Armenia’s Sunik province, or through Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea. Armenia is a natural choice for India due to Azerbaijan’s proximity to Pakistan and Turkey. Armenia actively supports INSTC.
(Author’s page of Csaba Káncz available here.)
